Glock on analytic philosophy and history by Alvarez, Maria
  1 
‘Glock on Analytic Philosophy and History’
1 
 
Chapter four of Glock’s wide-ranging and incisive book ‘What is Analytic Philosophy?’, 
which is entitled ‘History and Historiography’, explores the relationship between analytic 
philosophy and history. The chapter is presented as a critical examination of the idea that 
‘analytic philosophy can be conceived by reference to time’ (89) since, the suggestion goes, 
‘what sets analytic philosophy apart is its attitude to history’ (88). But the chapter is also a 
detailed exploration of a more general (philosophical) question: What attitude should 
philosophers take towards the history of philosophy, towards the history of ideas, and towards 
history in general? The answer favoured by Glock to that question is what he calls ‘weak 
historicism’ which, he claims, happens to be the attitude taken by most analytic philosophers. 
Glock begins by noting that analytic philosophy has often been accused of disregarding 
historical issues but, he contends, the accusation lacks bite, ‘not just because analytic 
philosophers take a greater interest in the past than is commonly assumed, but also because 
their neglect of some historical issues is not the mortal sin their critics make it out to be’(89). 
Glock goes on, as he often does in this book, to clarify terminology and draw distinctions. He 
explains that he will use the label ‘historicism’ to cover any ‘position that promotes historical 
thinking in philosophy and warns against ignoring or distorting the past’(89) but emphasises 
the need to distinguish different types within that class. So, there is intrinsic historicism, 
which maintains that ‘proper philosophy is ipso fact historical’ (90); instrumental historicism, 
for which the study of the past is a necessary means to ‘ends which themselves are not 
historical in nature’ (ibid.); and weak historicism, which holds that studying the past is useful 
but not indispensable for the proper pursuit of philosophy.  
In addition, and cutting across those positions, Glock notes that analytic philosophy has been 
charged with two history-related sins: historiophobia – a tendency to ignore the past; and 
anachronism – a tendency to distort it. His verdict is that these charges, especially the first, 
are fundamentally unfounded because analytic philosophers have, by-and-large, actually 
endorsed weak historicism. Moreover, the charges, he argues, seem both warranted and 
serious to some detractors of analytic philosophy because they, the detractors, tend to endorse 
either intrinsic or instrumental historicism. However, he says, they are wrong to do so, for 
‘[i]ntrinsic historicism is misguided, and the case for instrumental historicism remains 
unproven’(90). 
Glock deals with the position he calls ‘intrinsic historicism’ deftly and convincingly. Intrinsic 
historicists, both those who hold that proper philosophy is continuous with the natural 
sciences (Krüger, MacIntyre), and those who reject that claim (Gadamer, Rorty), fail to prove 
that philosophy is inherently historical – a conversation with tradition –  as opposed to a 
priori. As Glock points out, the problems of philosophy cannot be solved by ‘recording their 
history’(96) any more than they can be solved by observation or experiment. And the actual 
practice of philosophers, including the ‘great dead’ with whom intrinsic historicists urge us to 
engage in dialogue, attests to this fact. There is, Glock adds, something defeatist about this 
historicist position, for endorsing it requires us to abandon ‘the aspiration to tackle 
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philosophical problems by way of either solution or dissolution’(98) – an aspiration that many 
will feel amounts to abandoning the practice of philosophy altogether. 
Instrumental historicism fares no better under Glock’s scrutiny. Most of those who endorse 
this position (Williams and Taylor, for example) conceive of philosophy as a ‘special kind of 
self-understanding’ (97) which involves a clear articulation of the essential aspects of our 
conceptual framework. And since they, unlike Kant, do not take this framework to be an 
immutable structure, they think that no proper philosophical understanding can be achieved 
without examining either the history of the different ways in which our framework has been 
characterized (Taylor), or the historical development of that framework, that is, the historical 
development of our concepts (Williams). 
According to the first suggestion, in order to be in a position to challenge the status quo 
philosophers need to know the past – for only thus do they become aware that the status quo 
is one among several possible characterizations of our framework. But this position, Glock 
argues, conflates the need for an awareness of (the possibility of) alternative philosophical 
characterizations with the need for an awareness of past philosophical characterizations. 
Besides identifying this mistake, Glock diagnoses an infinite regress lurking in this view. For 
the argument ‘assumes that one can only overcome a philosophical position An if one is 
familiar with a prior alternative An-1’(99). But this, Glock says, cannot be right; otherwise it 
would be impossible for anyone to overcome any philosophical position – which is patently 
false, for the history of philosophy includes overcomings of this kind.  
One may feel that some wiggle room for the instrumental historicist remains. For the 
instrumental historicist may argue that, in some cases – perhaps at the beginning of history – 
there need only be two positions that have gradually (historically) become sufficiently 
differentiated from each other to provide the philosopher with the requisite awareness of the 
possibility of alternatives. These positions may be sufficiently different to count as genuine 
alternatives without that being the result of the one having been an orthodoxy that the other 
overthrew. If that is right, a philosopher with awareness of such alternative possibilities would 
be in a position to overcome the conception that is the status quo for him. But this defence, 
even if successful, is small change for instrumental historicism since, as Glock emphasises, 
everything about the practice of philosophy that this form of historicism claims to be 
conditional on awareness of historical variety is, at most, conditional on awareness of the 
possibility of variety – and this awareness may be obtained by surveying actual synchronic as 
well as diachronic variety or, even worse for the historicist, by considering mere possibilities. 
A related historicist position is held by some Nietzscheans who, like Williams seemed to do 
in places, advocate the widespread application of the genealogical method in philosophy. 
Glock charges them with falling prey to the genetic fallacy, ‘the mistake of deducing claims 
about the validity of a theory or the content of a concept from information about its historical 
origins, including information about the cause of its emergence’(101). Of course this is a 
charge that Williams himself was aware of and attempted to deflect but Glock argues 
persuasively that Williams only succeeds in showing that, for some beliefs and practices, their 
origin may be relevant to their justification. It doesn’t show that in philosophy in general the 
exploration of genesis and the assessment of validity go hand in hand. Moreover, Glock 
points out, which beliefs and practices fall in the category for which genealogy is relevant is 
determined by a-historical, a priori philosophical reflection.  
One more variant of historicism is subjected to critical examination, namely, ‘historical 
relativism’, which holds that ‘different philosophical positions are incommensurable: they   3 
cannot be assessed objectively from a neutral standpoint’(107). The positions comes in two 
forms: semantic and epistemic. Glock gives a series of arguments why this position is 
untenable in either form. Among other things, the position is self-undermining for, if there 
was indeed semantic incommensurability, then, the attempt to study the past would be 
impossible.
2 Moreover, as often happens with such extreme positions, it implicitly 
recommends attitudes to philosophy (typically, the need to refrain from engaging in it) that its 
advocates fail to follow. Its epistemic counterpart depends on a false assumption: that 
objective philosophical assessment requires, as Rorty seems to claim, a way of ‘stepping 
outside our belief system and conceptual apparatus as a whole and comparing it with 
reality’(108). And to compound the troubles that afflict this position, on examination it turns 
out that historic relativists of both complexions ‘incline towards circular reasoning’ for, on 
the one hand ‘relativism is supposed to be a lesson from history; on the other hand that lesson 
will only be revealed to those who approach history in the right relativistic spirit’(109).  
So Glock makes a good negative case for the claim that these kinds of historicism are 
confused or untenable. Some positive arguments for the answer he favours, namely weak 
historicism, are given in the final assessment of instrumental historicism, where it is said that 
several of the points raised by the latter suggest that the former is right: studying the past is 
not essential but is certainly advantageous to us in our philosophical pursuits, which is 
precisely what weak historicism says.  
Nonetheless, for all the force, scholarship and wit of Glock’s arguments in this chapter, there 
are two aspects of the picture he paints about which I have some doubts. First, while I am 
largely convinced by his criticism of the alternative positions he examines, weak historicism  
seems to me too weak. Second, the claim that analytic philosophy has not been characterised 
by some form of historiophobia seems to require qualification. Let me say something about 
each of these doubts in turn. 
The idea that knowledge of the history of philosophy is advantageous to our philosophising is 
surely uncontroversial. Engaging seriously and critically with the texts and arguments of past 
philosophers can help us in all sorts of ways. It helps us to understand better the philosophical 
questions we are engaged with: by comparing our questions which those that exercised 
philosophers in the past, noting the similarities and differences between them, and paying 
attention to the presuppositions and wider concerns that formed the background against which 
they asked their questions, we can understand our own questions better, sharpen them up, and 
gain awareness and better understanding of the presuppositions and wider concerns that form 
the background against which we are asking them, and thus acquire the distance that makes 
criticism easier. (This kind of exercise is aided by an approach to the history of philosophy 
that Glock says is favoured by the majority of analytic historians, ‘what Passmore labels 
“problematic histories” or the “history of problems” approach … Problematic historians asks 
questions like: Why were people exercised by certain problems, why did they utilize certain 
methods of tackling them, and why did they find certain solutions attractive?’(106).) Besides, 
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critical knowledge of the great figures of the past helps us to avoid their mistakes and absorb 
their insights, at least when we have enough philosophical acuity to spot them. These reasons 
to take a serious interest in the history of the subject are consistent with remaining alive to the 
distinction between philosophical and exegetical questions, and the realisation that addressing 
and solving the second is no substitute for addressing and solving the first, even when it is a 
help to it.  
What is harder to assess is the second part of weak historicism: that studying the past is not 
essential to philosophy. Without wanting to reintroduce any of the historicist positions 
persuasively dispatched by Glock, nor to claim that philosophy is anything other than a 
priori, I want to question the idea that an interest in the past is dispensable. It seems true that 
it is possible to do philosophy without concerning oneself with remote parts of the history of 
the subject, or with the details of the historical development of a problem or a position, or 
with the solution to any number of exegetical problems concerning a particular philosopher – 
that is, without being a historian of philosophy. But it is not clear that one can really do 
philosophy without studying, in the sense of engaging at a deep level with, at least some parts 
of the history of the subject. Even Wittgenstein, who disavowed knowledge or interest in the 
history of the subject, was consciously influenced by, and responding to, past philosophy, 
even if it was in the recent past, such as the thought of, among others, Schopenhauer, Frege 
and Russell - and, for the things about which he remained mostly silent, Kierkegaard. And in 
perhaps a less self-conscious way he was also responding to others: the private language 
argument is regarded by many, including Glock (98), as the most effective demolition of the 
Cartesian picture of a private inner realm. Wittgenstein may not have had Descartes explicitly 
in his sights when he developed the argument; nonetheless it is to Descartes that we owe the 
picture in all its compelling and alluring force. As has been noted (Hacking 1984, mentioned 
in Glock, 109) Descartes speaks very directly to contemporary undergraduates; but that is no 
coincidence, for as Kenny says, most educated people in the West have been profoundly 
influenced by Descartes’ conception of the mind (Kenny 1989: 2). So, however implicitly, 
Wittgenstein was responding to Descartes. Perhaps all that this amounts to is the truism that 
philosophical thinking does not occur in a vacuum and that, more or less deliberately and 
explicitly, and with various degrees of awareness that they are doing so, philosophers are 
always reacting to the problems, positions, concepts and arguments of their predecessors by 
challenging, refining, improving, or overthrowing them. So it might be said that, with various 
degrees of explicitness, doing philosophy involves engaging with its past.   
There also seems to be some truth in the suggestion that analytic philosophy, at least in its 
inception, was characterised by a tendency to neglect or disregard the history of philosophy as 
a whole. At any rate, this seems true of the attitudes of many of the figures that Glock 
presents as paradigms of analytic philosophy. As Glock himself says, the Vienna Circle, the 
author of the Philosophical Investigations and plausibly also the author of the Tractatus, and 
perhaps the Oxford ‘ordinary language’ philosophers as well, saw ‘the history of philosophy 
… primarily as a history of nonsense or mistakes’(91). Perhaps Russell cannot be accused of 
ignoring the past: after all, he wrote a history of Western philosophy. But his motivation in 
doing so was not to aid his philosophising, and his treatment of some of its main figures and 
their views and arguments was cavalier. Even Ryle’s remarks that the ‘figures of the past 
“sometimes said significant things” and that they should be treated “more like colleagues than 
like pupils”’ (94) seems a little half-hearted – not quite Newton’s: ‘if I have seen a little 
further it is by standing on the shoulders of giants’ (a phrase which, incidentally, is attributed 
to the twelve-century neo-Platonist philosopher Bernard de Chartres, who used it to describe 
his relationship to Greek philosophers).    5 
To be sure, things changed and, as Glock notes, after the 1960s analytic philosophy became 
more interested in the history of the subject, ‘prompting von Wright to speak of a 
“retrospective turn”’(92). Von Wright’s phrase is significant both because it suggests that 
there had indeed been something of a neglect of the explicit study of the history of philosophy 
before then, and because it prompts the question: why this ‘retrospective turn’? The answer is 
complex, but part of it is that this was always the standard approach and the attitude that 
prevailed in the previous couple of decades was the exception. 
In showing that analytic philosophy is not historiophobic, Glock claims that analytic interest 
in the history of philosophy now extends to all periods. But this seems less true of mediaeval 
philosophy, which has been the period most assiduously neglected by analytic philosophers. 
The neglect is reflected in the syllabi of analytic philosophy departments, at least in the UK, 
where the history of philosophy beings with Plato and Aristotle, with an occasional mention 
of the Pre-Socratics, and continues with Descartes. (Glock’s own excellent ‘Historical 
Survey’ illustrates the point). The revival of interest in the Medieval period was partly due, 
ironically, to the influence of a handful of Wittgensteinians (e.g. Anscombe, Geach and 
Kenny) with an interest in Scholastic Aristotelian philosophy. There is a further irony in the 
fact that medieval philosophy has been neglected by analytic philosophers because there are  
striking similarities between the two traditions, as the historian of philosophy, John 
Marenbon, notes: 
Philosophy now (in the English-speaking countries) is an academic discipline, pursued 
by a small number of highly trained specialists in university departments. In the latter 
Middle Ages, too, sophisticated abstract thought was conducted by masters of arts and 
theology in the universities – an intellectual elite that had received a lengthy 
education. (Marenbon 1993: 86). 
And the similarity is not restricted to the context in which philosophy was carried out but it 
extends to method and topics, for example, the importance placed on logic and language, and  
the reliance on technical terms. Despite highlighting these similarities, Marenbon is aware of 
the danger of exaggerating  them and ‘making anachronistic assumptions about the identity of 
the problems discussed’(op cit, 89) by medieval and analytic philosophers. Nonetheless, he 
identifies some areas of common interest to both: ‘for example, topics in the philosophy of 
mind and action such as knowledge, memory, emotion and intention or topics in philosophical 
logic such as signification, self-reference and modality’(op cit, 90).  
The neglect of the Mediaeval period is to be explained by a variety of factors, including a lack 
of familiarity with its complex technical terminology. In addition, the fact that most 
Mediaeval philosophers were theologians, and that they operated within tight doctrinal 
constraints is mistakenly thought to diminish the interest and value of their work. This was 
certainly Russell’s view. Commenting on Aquinas’s Summa Contra Gentiles, he says:  
 
He wrote another book, Summa Theologiae, of almost equal importance, but of 
somewhat less interest to us because less designed to use arguments not assuming in 
advance the truth of Christianity (Russell 1946: 419). 
Since many of Aquinas’s disagreements in the ST concerned the views of philosophers and 
theologians who also assumed the truth of Christianity, and since many of his arguments 
relied on Aristotle, who didn’t, this remark suggests that Russell simply did not understand 
the nature of Aquinas’s project. Russell also says that in Aquinas ‘the appeal to reason is, in a 
sense, insincere, since the conclusion to be reached is fixed in advance’ (Russell 1946: 426),   6 
and so, he concludes, there is ‘little of the true philosophic spirit in Aquinas’, because ‘he 
does not set out to follow wherever the argument may lead’ (Russell 1946: 427). These 
remarks, apart from betraying an implausibly idealistic conception of rational thought, sit a 
little uncomfortably with some other remarks by Russell, for example: ‘I cannot see how to 
refute the arguments for the subjectivity of ethical values, but I find myself incapable of 
believing that all that is wrong with wanton cruelty is that I don’t like it’. 
Ultimately, the retrospective turn in analytic philosophy has surely resulted from a gradual 
reawakening to the fact that the philosophers of the past, both recent and remote (and that 
includes ‘Continental’ philosophers), have much to offer us. Whether we are aware of it or 
not, we are often responding to their problems, insights and mistakes and therefore, the better 
we know and understanding those, the better off we will be; and, often, it is only ignorance 
and prejudice that prevents us from appreciating this fact. This seems to favour a stronger 
form of historicism than that accepted by Glock: that, while it may be possible to pursue 
philosophical questions without detailed study of the history of philosophy, it is impossible to 
do philosophy without in fact engaging with that history and, therefore, it would be folly – 
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